Future approach to enforcement
Looking ahead, there will likely be significant changes to the FCA’s and the PRA’s approach to enforcement activity. In May 2023, the PRA consulted on proposed changes and clarifications to its approach to enforcement.
The PRA’s proposals included two significant proposals. Firstly, the introduction of an early account scheme, to encourage subjects of investigations to provide detailed factual accounts of relevant facts at an early stage of an investigation in order to expedite the PRA’s fact-finding process in return for a higher discount on any fines imposed. Secondly, changes to the way that the PRA calculates fines that are imposed on firms which, if implemented, would see the PRA break away from the revenue-based formula that it and the FCA have used for many years, and replace it with a system that would vary the size of fine according to a firm’s category and the severity of the breach. This change is likely to result in higher fines in most cases.
The PRA’s enforcement team seems increasingly keen to tackle cases independently of its counterpart division at the FCA. Since 2021, 71% of enforcement action taken by the PRA has related to standalone cases, where the PRA has taken enforcement action without the FCA also doing so at or around the same time and in relation to the same or similar facts.
The FCA has faced a series of challenges and criticisms from the Upper Tribunal in the last year, where the Upper Tribunal has criticised the FCA’s investigation and enforcement processes. In one case, the Upper Tribunal awarded partial costs to two individuals, finding that the FCA had acted unreasonably, although the FCA has been granted permission to appeal that decision (Seiler and Whitestone v FCA [2023] UKUT 00270 (TCC). The Upper Tribunal’s recent criticisms of the FCA may be a consequence of the FCA having taken on more ambitious and complex cases in the last few years, which have proved more difficult to bring and defend. It remains to be seen whether this criticism will result in the FCA reverting to more conventional and safer cases, especially those that it is confident of winning if challenged before the Upper Tribunal.
Financial crime
Across the FCA’s open enforcement case portfolio there has been a decrease in the number of open cases that are being pursued on a purely regulatory basis. In contrast, the number of cases being pursued on a criminal basis remains steady and there has been an increase in the number of dual-track cases, where criminal and regulatory cases are investigated concurrently before a decision is taken by the FCA to take action through one of those routes. This suggests there has been no diminution in the FCA’s focus on criminal conduct. It may also suggest that the FCA is less quick to close criminal investigations or is delaying taking decisions on dual-track cases until quite far into the investigation.
There is a continuing reduction in the number of FCA investigations that are primarily focused on financial crime; based on figures for 2022/23, these now represent only 8% of the FCA’s open case portfolio (excluding cases relating to unauthorised business), down from a high of 20% in 2017/18. This may reflect a belief held by the FCA that it has done a lot of work over the last few years to convey its key messages, from a financial crime perspective, particularly in relation to anti-money laundering (AML) systems and controls. But this reduction in the number of open enforcement cases is only part of the picture.
Consistent with the FCA’s increasing use of its supervisory intervention powers, in 2022/23 the FCA opened 613 financial crime supervision cases, an increase of 65% compared with 2021/22. This is likely to have a few consequences. Firstly, supervisory action is often a precursor to enforcement action, so a surge in supervisory activity may drive increased levels of enforcement action in the future. Secondly, consistent with the FCA’s increased use of early interventions, firms can expect to see increased use of compulsory and voluntary variations of permission in relation to financial crime issues (see “FCA early intervention” above). These variations can have significant business effects for a firm, such as limiting its ability to onboard particular types of customers. It can also present further enforcement risks if the firm does not have systems and controls in place to ensure that it complies with the variation of permission.
Financial penalties
The level of fines imposed on firms by the FCA for financial crime related failings fell significantly in 2022. The FCA imposed fines on seven firms for financial crime failings in each of 2021/22 and 2022/23, but the average fine value in 2021/22 was GBP71m, compared with only GBP19.5m in 2022/23. Overall, the total value of fines imposed on firms for financial crime failings has fallen from GBP495.5m in 2021/22, including a court imposed fine following a criminal prosecution, to GBP137m in 2022/23, representing a 72% drop. This largely reflects the fact that fewer fines were imposed on larger financial institutions in 2022/23, whose higher revenues drive larger fines under the FCA’s current penalty calculation methodology.
Uplifts were applied to all of the fines imposed by the FCA between October 2022 and October 2023 in relation to financial crime issues, to reflect what the FCA considered to be aggravating factors. These uplifts ranged from 10% to 40%. Fines were also increased in just over half of all cases to ensure that the penalty acted as a sufficient deterrent to the firm in question and to other firms.
The aggravating factor most commonly cited in FCA final enforcement notices over the last couple of years, is a firm’s failure to follow the FCA’s financial crime related guidance. A key mitigating factor has been the proactive implementation of significant remediation exercises; sometimes these have been allied with the voluntary cessation of specific types of business or onboarding of particular classes of customers, while remediation is implemented.
Common failings
Common failings identified by the FCA in its financial crime enforcement actions in the past couple of years include:
- Inadequate investigation or escalation of red flags or staff concerns.
- Inadequate policies, procedures and guidance.
- Inadequate communication of policies and procedures.
- Failure to follow a firm’s own procedures
- Inadequate customer due diligence (CDD), enhanced due diligence and ongoing customer monitoring.
- Inadequate transaction monitoring.
- Failure to adequately implement remediations.
- Insufficient prioritisation of financial crime prevention.
Unsurprisingly, failings relating to policies and procedures still feature prominently, and the challenges of getting CDD and transaction monitoring right, particularly in mass market businesses, also remains a significant issue. This is often allied to problems with resourcing and the timely implementation of remediation in relation to identified risks.
Emerging risks
One area of potential emerging risk is sanctions. This has been an area of increased focus by the FCA following firms’ need to respond to the imposition of widespread sanctions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The FCA is using an increasingly data-led approach to supervise firms proactively in order to ensure that they have appropriate sanctions systems and controls. This includes using synthetic data, provided by the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI), to test firms’ sanctions screening processes.
In September 2023, feedback on the FCA’s review of firms’ sanctions systems and controls was published. It identified a number of concerns, including:
- Poor governance and inadequate management information.
- The use of global systems and policies that were insufficiently tailored to the UK’s sanctions regime.
- Poor understanding of outsourced sanctions screening processes.
- Under-resourcing and backlogs.
- Poor calibration of screening tools.
- Poor customer due diligence and “know your customer” checks.
Taking note of and reacting appropriately to guidance such as this is all the more important in an enforcement climate where a failure to follow FCA guidance is the most commonly cited aggravating factor in financial crime related enforcement notices.
The FCA is particularly concerned about firms not reporting suspected sanctions breaches to it on a timely basis or, in some cases, at all. It has made it very clear that it expects any such breaches to be reported to the FCA as well as to the OFSI. Nikhil Rathi, CEO of the FCA, has stated that, while the OFSI is the primary enforcer of the UK sanctions regime, the FCA will also consider it appropriate to bring regulatory enforcement cases if it identifies material weaknesses in firms’ sanctions systems and controls.
Culture, governance and individual accountability
The approach to enforcement in the area of culture and governance in 2023 has not been what most people might have predicted.
Senior managers
Both the FCA’s and PRA’s approach to enforcement investigations into senior managers and certified persons remains relatively modest. As of October 2023, the FCA had only 39 senior managers and 10 certified persons and conduct rule staff under investigation, while the PRA had 11 senior managers and certified persons under investigation. However, the FCA still had 92 legacy cases involving individuals who were subject to the previous approved persons regime.
At the end of 2023, only two senior managers have faced enforcement action since the introduction of the SMCR. The first was in 2017 and the second was announced in April 2023. The latter relates to enforcement action taken by the PRA against a senior manager for failing to take reasonable steps to discharge their regulatory obligations. A third enforcement case against a senior manager is being challenged before the Upper Tribunal and concerns issues relating to that senior manager’s integrity.
The authors had expected the number of enforcement investigations under the SMCR to rise as more individuals and firms came within its scope. But this has not happened. In fact, the regulators have fewer open cases against senior managers and certified persons in 2023 than they did in 2021, indicating a more cautious approach to opening enforcement investigations in this area than anticipated.
However, the regulators have not held back from criticising senior management in enforcement findings made about firms. In 83% of enforcement cases involving firms that were published between January 2022 and October 2023, the FCA and PRA attributed firms’ failings to inadequate oversight by one or more members of their senior management teams. Many enforcement cases also included criticisms about senior management in relation to escalation, or the lack thereof, and ineffective governance bodies.
There have also been some interesting comments from the regulators about senior management’s reliance on internal and external advisers and other third parties, specifically about the circumstances in which it may or may not be reasonable for a senior manager to rely on something or someone to help to discharge their own personal regulatory obligations.
Culture and incentives
Significant failings at firms will often have a cultural issue as an important driver and poor culture, often in pockets of a firm’s business, can create an environment where inappropriate behaviour and standards are either tolerated or become the norm. Firms should be aware that regulators often also perceive these issues as indicative of a problem with the firm’s speak-up culture or its approach to creating a safe place to work. Often, with the benefit of hindsight, it becomes apparent that poor behaviour within a certain team or area was known about, but the firm’s culture did not enable individuals to challenge the behaviour or escalate their concerns at an early stage.
Both the PRA and FCA are also concerned about the role of incentives in shaping a firm’s culture, especially its risk culture. The events surrounding the collapse of Archegos Capital Management have caused both regulators to focus on risk management and risk culture. Both of these themes feature strongly in current enforcement and supervisory activity. For example, in December 2021 the FCA and PRA sent a joint Dear CEO letter identifying findings that emerged from the work they had done investigating this matter. The messages in that letter relating to risk culture and risk management were particularly stark, suggesting that important lessons learnt from the 2008 global financial crisis had not been fully embedded. A lot these messages have been repeated and amplified in 2023; for example, in the PRA’s Final Notice against a firm in relation to the Archegos collapse, portfolio letters and a Dear CEO letter.
In particular, the regulators are concerned about:
- Poorly defined and understood boundaries between the three lines of defence.
- Risk functions lacking sufficient standing and influence within firms.
- Poor understanding of client business and risk profiles.
- Cultures that fail to adequately balance considerations of risk against commercial
This is expected to be an important area of continuing focus for firms and both regulators.
Code of Conduct breach reporting
According to the latest data, out of the firms that are obliged to report breaches of the Code of Conduct to the FCA, only a small fraction report any such breaches. Out of the 42,000 firms required to file REP0008 returns to the FCA in 2022, just 769 firms, or 1.8%, reported a total of 4,164 breaches.
However, the number of Code of Conduct breaches that firms have identified and reported to the FCA has been increasing steadily in line with the expansion of the SMCR. The FCA received 36% more breach notifications in 2022 than in 2021, even though these dates did not coincide with a significant expansion of the SMCR. These reports, together with the disclosures that firms must make to the FCA under Principle 11 of the FCA’s Principles for Businesses, give the FCA an insight into the types of misconduct that firms are identifying and tackling.